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LABOR LAW: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
LISA A. JENSEN*
JEFFREY R. PATT**

During the 1984-85 term the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit decided a substantial number of labor law cases. The
court addressed significant issues concerning fair share fee clauses, superseniority, and the preemptive power of the NLRA. The court also addressed several significant employment discrimination issues involving
actions brought under Title VII, section 1983, section 1981, and section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. This article will briefly address some of
the significant cases decided during the 1984-85 term and examine the
impact of these cases on the labor law field.
HUDSON: THE RIGHT OF NONUNION MEMBERS OF A BARGAINING
UNIT PURSUANT TO A FAIR SHARE FEE CLAUSE

"Fair share fee" clauses have long been an accepted means of distributing the costs of collective bargaining among those who benefit from
collective bargaining.' A fair share fee clause generally requires nonunion members of the collective bargaining unit to contribute a proportionate amount of the anticipated collective bargaining costs for the
forthcoming year. Though such clauses require nonunion members to
contribute to organizations which they may politically or ideologically
oppose, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of fair share fee clauses in order to avoid the inequity of allowing
nonunion members to enjoy free union representation. 2 In Hudson v.
Chicago Teachers Union,3 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals limited
the control of unions over appropriated fair share fee amounts.
* B.S., Political Science, Illinois State University, 1984; Candidate for J.D., IIT ChicagoKent, 1987.
** B.S., Business Administration, University of Illinois, 1984; Candidate for J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent, 1987.
1. In Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), the Supreme Court held that
union-shop agreements between railroads and unions did not violate the first amendment or due
process clause.
2. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 761-63 (1961).
3. 743 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986).
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The Supreme Court's Treatment of Fair Share Fee Clauses
Although a union may use fair share fees collected from nonunion
members for those costs which are germane to collective bargaining, a
union may not use such funds for political or ideological activities. 4 In
InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Street,5 the Supreme Court held
that a nonunion member's grievance arose upon the union's expenditure
of appropriated fair share fees on political or ideological activities. 6 According to the Supreme Court, the nonunion member's grievance did not
arise upon the mere collection of fair share fees. 7 The Supreme Court
further stated that if the union used the appropriated dues for activities
germane to collective bargaining, then the nonunion members would
8
have no grievance against the union.
While Street dealt with railway employees subject to the provisions
of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 9 the Supreme Court has held that
Street and its RLA progeny apply to cases involving public employees as
well. 10 Thus, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,II the Court held
that the Constitution did not bar a fair share fee clause in a collective
12
bargaining agreement between a municipality and a teachers' union.
In implementing fair share fee clauses applicable to public employees, unions are subject to the due process clause.13 Any grievance procedure provided to nonunion members must not infringe such members'
right to due process. The Supreme Court's holding that no grievance
arises until the union spends the fair share fees on political or ideological
activities implies that nonunion members may not challenge the constitutionality of a grievance procedure until the union spends the fair share
4. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977). Such use of appropriated funds
would violate the nonunion members' free speech right.
5. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
6. 367 U.S. at 771. The nonunion members had a duty to pay the fair share fee; the union had
a duty to spend the appropriated funds on activities germane to collective bargaining. In Street,
several railway employees challenged a union-shop agreement entered pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1982), on the grounds that the union's expenditure of such dues
on political activities against the employees' dissent violated their constitutional rights.
7. 367 U.S. at 771.

8. Id.
9. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1982).
10. Abood, 431 U.S. 209, 226 (1977).
11. 431 U.S. 209.
12. Id. at 225. The Court stated that "It]he same important government interests recognized in
the Hanson and Street cases presumptively support the impingement upon associational freedom
created by the agency shop here at issue."
13. Hudson, 743 F.2d at 1191. The court stated that when a private entity and a public agency
act together to deprive people of their federal constitutional rights, the private entity acts under color
of state law. See also Tower v. Glover, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 2824-25 (1984); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.
24, 27-28 (1980).
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fees. In Hudson, the Seventh Circuit held that nonunion members have a
due process right to an adequate grievance procedure prior to the union's
14
expenditure of the fair share fees.
The Facts in Hudson
Pursuant to a fair share fee clause contained in the collective bargaining agreement between the Board of Education ("Board") and the
Chicago Teacher's Union ("Union"), nonunion members were required
to contribute 95% of the union dues charged union members. 1 5 The
Union also provided a grievance procedure for challenging expenditures
of the fair share fees for political or ideological activities. 16 The procedure for challenging such expenditures contained the following features:
(1) An arbitration proceeding would follow the exhaustion of
union remedies, 17 and the CTU president would select the arbitrator
from a list maintained
by the Illinois State Board of Education of ac18
credited arbitrators;
(2) The arbitrator would decide whether the union used the fees
for political or ideological activities and such decision would be final;
and
(3) A successful challenge would entitle the nonunion member
to a rebate of the excess fee, and a future reduction of the fee. 19
Several nonunion members brought a section 1983 civil rights action
against the Union and the Board. 20 The nonunion members argued that
the grievance procedure itself violated their free speech and due process
rights. The nonunion members made no claim concerning any Union
14. 743 F.2d at 1192.
15. The clause stated in pertinent part that nonunion members must "pay to the UNION each
month their proportionate share of the cost of the collective bargaining process and contract administration measured by the amount of dues uniformly required by members of the UNION." Hudson
v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, 573 F. Supp. 1505 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (citing Articles 1, § 8.2
of the one-year collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the Board, effective September 1, 1982). Prior to the enactment of legislation permitting the Board to agree to "fair share fee"
clauses, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, 10-22.40a repealed by Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 48,
1701 et seq. (1984), the nonunion members were not required to contribute to
collective bargaining costs despite the fact that they were covered by the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. Hudson, 573 F. Supp. at 1507.
16. 743 F.2d at 1194.
17. Id. Prior to arbitration, an aggrieved nonunion member was entitled to review by the
union's executive committee and a personal appeal before the committee.
18. Id. In addition, the union paid the arbitrator's fee.
19. Id. The rebate remedy was only available to the successful challenger, while the future
reduction remedy was available for all nonunion members.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The court stated that, while a § 1983 suit was not the usual means
of challenging a fair share fee dispute, such a challenge was nevertheless proper. Although the union
is a private entity, the Board of Education acted as the union's agent, and § 1983 covers the situation
where "a public employer assists a union in coercing public employees to finance political activities.. " 743 F.2d at 1191.
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expenditure of appropriated dues. 21 The district court held that the
grievance procedure was constitutionally adequate. 22 The court of appeals held that the procedure was constitutionally inadequate, reversing
the district court's decision and remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. 23 The Supreme Court has subsequently
24
affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision.
The Seventh Circuit's Reasoning
The Seventh Circuit held that the nonunion members had valid
grounds on which to bring a section 1983 action because an inadequate
grievance procedure would violate their right to both free speech and due
process. 25 According to the court, a procedure which merely threatens
the deprivation of free speech violates the first amendment even if the
procedure does not in fact result in such deprivation. 26 Thus, the nonunion members could bring suit without alleging any wrongful Union expenditures.
The fair share fees, including those which covered
negotiating and collective bargaining expenses, violated the nonunion
members' right to free association because they required nonunion members to contribute to an organization which they might politically or
ideologically oppose. 27 Such violations were lawful, however, to the extent they were necessary to avoid the inequity of allowing nonunion
members to enjoy free union representation. 28 Due process requires that
procedures must be implemented to, "assure that the deprivation [of first
amendment rights] will go no further than is necessary ....-29
The court held that the Union's grievance procedure did not ade21. 743 F.2d at 1192.
22. 573 F. Supp. at 1513.

23. 743 F.2d at 1197.
24. 106
25. 743
26. Id.
Promotions,

S. Ct. 1066 (1986).
F.2d at 1192.
The court cited several Supreme Court decisions in accord. See, e.g., Southeastern
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552-62 (1975); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58

(1965). The court regarded the nonunion members' decision to not join the union as an exercise of
their freedom to associate-an ancillary freedom to free speech. 743 F.2d at 1193 (citing L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 700-10 (1978)). The freedom to associate implies the freedom
to not associate. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235. See also Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1228 (1985); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3252
(1984).
27. 743 F.2d at 1192-93. The court's fourteenth amendment analysis also revolved around the
nonunion members' freedom of association. Due process requires timely and adequate notice and
hearing concerning an impending deprivation of liberty. The liberty threatened in Hudson was the

freedom of association.
28. 743 F.2d at 1193. The necessity, in Hudson, arose because prior to the institution of the
agency fee, the nonunion members were receiving the benefits of collective bargaining without contributing to the costs.

29. Id.
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quately ensure that fair share fees would only be used for activities germane to collective bargaining. The first inadequacy was the Union's sole
control over the procedure and selection of an arbitrator. The court
analogized the Union's selection of an arbitrator to an adverse party in a
lawsuit selecting the judge.30 In addition, the court held that the arbitrator would have an interest in the arbitration's outcome under the procedure because the Union paid the arbitrator's fee. 31 Thus, the court held
that there was "a sufficient residue of adverseness" between the parties
which entitled the nonunion members to a procedure over which they
32
exerted more control.
Furthermore, the arbitrator was required to determine whether the
fair share fees exceeded those which were necessary pursuant to the nonunion members' right to due process without a provision for judicial recourse. The Supreme Court has implied that arbitrators are not
competent to make first amendment determinations.3 3 Thus, the Union's
grievance procedure failed to provide for an adequate determination of
the constitutionality of the fair share fees.
Finally, the court held that the "rebate and reduction" remedy
available upon a successful challenge was inadequate because it would
allow the Union to obtain "an involuntary loan for purposes to which the
employee objects."'3 4 The Supreme Court, in Ellis v. Brotherhoodof Railway Clerks,35 held that such a remedy would be constitutionally inadequate even if the union paid interest on the excess fair share fee because
the union was free to use the fee as it saw fit prior to the rebate, and the
nonunion members were deprived of their right to use the money as they
chose. 36 In Hudson, the Seventh Circuit established the requirement that
the Union place the fair share fees in an escrow account, preferably one
in which management, as well as custody, is turned over to the escrow
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1195. The Supreme Court had held that "no man is permitted to try cases where he
has an interest in the outcome." Id. (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
32. 743 F.2d at 1193.
33. 743 F.2d at 1195-96 (citing McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984)). In
McDonald, the Supreme Court refused to collaterally estop a civil rights action where an arbitrator
had earlier held that a public employee had been discharged for just cause. Arbitrators are experts at
interpreting contracts, not the Constitution. 466 U.S. at 287-89.
34. 743 F.2d at 1196 (quoting Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 446 U.S. 435, 442 (1984)). In
addition to the fact that the union was free to use the fees prior to the rebate for political or ideological purposes to which the nonunion members might object, the nonunion members were deprived of
their right to use the money as they chose.
35. 446 U.S. 435 (1984).
36. Id. at 442. In Hudson, the union did not pay the successful challenger interest on the
rebated excess, nor did the union pay any excess to those nonunion members not a party to the
challenge.
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agent. 37
The court further held that, prior to the Union's expenditure of appropriated dues, due process requires that a collective bargaining agreement provide a grievance procedure which includes at least "fair notice,
a prompt administrative hearing before the Board of Education or some
other state or local agency-the hearing to incorporate the usual safeguards for evidentiary hearings before administrative agencies-and a
38
right of judicial review of the agency's decision."
Analysis of Hudson
Despite the inference in Street that nonunion member grievances
may only arise subsequent to union expenditure, more recent Supreme
Court decisions have paved the way for nonunion member grievances
prior to union expenditure. According to the Supreme Court in Ellis, the
"rebate and reduction" remedy violated the due process rights of nonunion members. 39 Such violation occurred when the involuntary loan began, i.e. when the Union assessed the fair share fees.
While the Seventh Circuit relied on Ellis in holding the Union's rebate and reduction remedy constitutionally inadequate, 4° the court failed
to consider two other recent cases which the Supreme Court summarily
dismissed. 41 In Jibson v. White Cloud Education Association,42 and
Kempner v. DearbornLocal 2077,43 the Supreme Court dismissed appeals
from decisions entered by the Michigan Court of Appeals. In White
Cloud, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a nonunion member
could bring an action for a declaratory judgment provided that he had
paid the fair share fee. 44 In Kempner, the Michigan Court of Appeals
held that placement of the entire fair share fee in escrow was improper
because such remedy impaired the union's right to contribution to collec37. 743 F.2d at 1196.
38. Id.
39. 446 U.S. at 442. The Court reasoned that such a result would be justifiable if no readily
available alternative existed.
40. 743 F.2d at 1196.
41. Summary dismissals by the Supreme Court are dispositions on the merits and are binding
on lower courts. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 34445 (1975).
42. 105 S. Ct. 236 (1984).
43. 105 S. Ct. 316 (1984).
44. 101 Mich. App. 309, 300 N.w.2d 551, 555 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Jibson v.
White Cloud Educ. Ass'n, 105 S.Ct. 236 (1984). The court reasoned that this allowed the nonunion
members to seek timely vindication of his constitutional rights, while not crippling the union by
nonaccess to those fees germane to collective bargaining.
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tive bargaining costs from every employee. 4 5 The Supreme Court's summary dismissals in these cases stand as precedent for the recognition of
such nonunion member grievances prior to union expenditure.
Abood, Ellis, White Cloud and Kempner suggest that the Supreme
Court continues to seek a balance between the nonunion member's right
to due process and free speech, and the union's right to proportionate
contribution for collective bargaining costs. 46 Clearly, the Supreme
Court's approval of the escrow remedy 4 7 and declaratory judgment remedy 48 indicates that nonunion members have a cause of action available
prior to union expenditure. The Seventh Circuit's recognition of the
right of nonunion members to bring a due process challenge directed at
the grievance procedure prior to union expenditure is consistent with the
Supreme Court trend toward recognizing the right to bring a grievance
prior to expenditure. The Seventh Circuit's suggestion, however, of placing the entire fair share fee in escrow is inconsistent with the purpose of
fair share fee clauses and with established precedent. Placement of the
entire fair share fee in escrow runs directly counter to Kempner. A large
portion of the fair share fee is undisputably legitimate. As long as the
legitimate portion of the fair share fee remains in escrow, the Union remains deprived of proportionate contribution from nonunion members.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Several of the Seventh Circuit's decisions in the 1984-85 term involved issues of employment discrimination. This section will examine
some of the more significant decisions this term involving issues of employment discrimination.
Successor Doctrine: Section 1981
When a business which has participated in discriminatory employment practices subsequently transfers ownership or a significant amount
of its assets to another entity, a question arises as to whether the succeeding entity is liable for the discriminatory practices of the business
which it has succeeded. A finding of liability would reflect application of
the successor doctrine to discrimination cases. The Seventh Circuit had
the opportunity in the 1984-85 term to address this issue of first impres45. 337 N.w.2d 354, 358 (Mich. App. 1983), appeal dismissed sub nom. Kempner v. Dearborn
Local 2077, 105 S. Ct. 316 (1984).
46. San Jose Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 839, 700 P.2d 1252, 1264, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 250 (1985).
47. Ellis, 104 S. Ct. at 1890.
48. White Cloud, 105 S. Ct. 236.
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sion. Specifically, in Musikiwamba v. ESSI,49 the court considered
whether the successor doctrine should apply in employment discrimination actions brought under section 1981.50 To place the case in its relevant legal context, the development of the law regarding the successor
doctrine will be discussed prior to presentation of the case.
Background
The Supreme Court first considered the successor doctrine in the
context of NLRA violations. The Court's first decision in the area was
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston."' There, the Court held that a
successor company which is engaged in substantially the same type of
business as the company it succeeded must bargain with the union recognized by the preceeding company. The successor company must also arbitrate under the collective bargaining contract to which the preceding
company had agreed.
The Court based its holding in Wiley on the furtherance of federal
labor policy. It recognized that arbitration plays a key role in promoting
the federal labor policy of peaceful settlement of labor disputes. Hence,
the arbitration process should not be hindered by sudden changes in em52
ployment relations brought on by a change in company ownership.
This focus on federal labor policy was also incorporated in the
Supreme Court's next major decision involving the successor doctrine.
In Goldenstate Bottling Co. v. NLRB,5 3 the Supreme Court held that an
employer who acquires substantial assets of a predecessor, and continues
the predecessor's business without interruption or substantial change,
and who has notice of an unfair labor practice charge against the predecessor, can be required under the successor doctrine to remedy that unfair practice.
Finally, the most recent Supreme Court case involving the successor
doctrine enunciated the limitations of the doctrine. In Howard Johnson
Co. v. Hotel Employees,5 4 the Court held that a successor employer was
49. Musikiwamba v. ESSI, 760 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985).
50. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
51. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
52. Id. at 549.
53. 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
54. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
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not required to hire any of the predecessor's employees. The Court went
on to hold that when the successor only hired a few of the predecessor's
employees, the successor was similarly not required to arbitrate with the
incumbent union.
After the Supreme Court's handling of the successor doctrine in Wiley, Golden State, and Howard Johnson, lower courts began to explore
the possibility of applying that doctrine to non-NLRA situations. Many
of these courts followed the lead that the Supreme Court laid out in Wiley and asked whether the application of the successor doctrine to these
55
new areas would further federal labor policy.
The Sixth Circuit was the first circuit to hold the successor doctrine
applicable to employment discrimination cases. In MacMillan v. Board
Bloedel Container Corp.,56 the Sixth Circuit held that the successor doctrine applied to Title VII actions. 57 The majority of the circuits followed
suit. 58 However, very few courts have discussed the applicability of the
successor doctrine to employment discrimination cases brought under
section 1981. 59 Hence, the Seventh Circuit was faced in Musikiwamba v.
ESSI, with an issue that not only was one of first impression in the Sev60
enth Circuit, but was a question virtually unexamined by other circuits.
Musikiwamba v. ESSI
In Musikiwamba, Muswamba Musikiwamba, filed a section 1981
employment discrimination suit against his employer, Electronic Support
Systems (Electronic). 6 1 Prior to this suit coming to trial, Electronic noti55. See, e.g., EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974);
Trujillo v. Longhorn Mgf. Co., 694 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1982); In re National Airlines, Inc., 700 F.2d
695 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Gardner v. Pan Am. Airways, 464 U.S. 933 (1983).
56. 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974).
57. In Bloedel the court laid down nine criteria that should be examined to determine whether
successor liability may be imposed. These criteria are: (1) whether the successor company had
notice of the change; (2) the ability of the predecessor to provide relief; (3) whether there has been a
substantial continuity of business operations; (4) whether the new employer uses the same plant;
(5) whether he uses the same or substantially the same work force; (6) whether he uses the same or
substantially the same supervisory personnel; (7) whether the same job exists under substantially the
same working conditions; (8) whether he uses the same machinery, equipment and methods of production; (9) whether he produces the same product. Id. at 1094.
58. See supra note 55.
59. It appears that only three cases have raised the question of applying the successor doctrine
to § 1981 suits. Trujillo v. Longhorn Mfg. Co., No. 80-089-M Civil (D.N.M. 1980), afid, 694 F.2d
221 (10th Cir. 1982) (the court of appeals was not asked to reach the § 1981 question, but the district
court held that the successor doctrine does not apply in § 1981 suits); Howard v. Penn Central
Transp. Co., 87 F.R.D. 342 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (the court applied the successor doctrine to § 1981
suits); Escamilla v. Mosher Steel Co., 386 F. Supp. 101 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (the court applied the
doctrine to Title VII and assumed, without discussion that it applied to § 1981 also).
60. See supra note 59.
61. Plaintiff also brought suit against the officer of the successor corporation who was primarily
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fled Musikiwamba that it was transferring substantially all of its assets to
ESSI, Inc. Consequently, Musikiwamba filed a petition to restrain the
transfer and a motion to add ESSI as an additional defendant.
Musikiwamba claimed that ESSI was a successor to Electronic and as
62
such was liable to him for Electronic's discrimination.
ESSI filed a motion to dismiss the action, claiming that as mere purchasers of the assets of Electronic, ESSI could not be held liable for the
debts of Electronic. 63 The district court granted the motion, holding that
the successor doctrine does not apply to section 1981 suits due to the
substantial differences between section 1981 suits and suits brought
under Title VII.
The district court felt that the principal difference was the fact that
section 1981 suits require the plaintiff to prove that the employer intended to discriminate, while in a Title VII action proof of intent is not
required. 64 The district court felt that if a court could find a successor
company liable for a section 1981 violation merely on the basis that it
acquired substantially all the assets of the preceding company, then the
intent requirement would be meaningless. The party being held liable
would be someone with no intent at all to discriminate against the plaintiff. The district court felt that this would be antithetical to section 1981
suits.

65

The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court decision,, holding
that the successor doctrine is applicable to section 1981 cases. 6 6 It relied,
as did the Supreme Court in its earlier decisions, on federal labor policy.
The court found an overriding federal policy against discrimination.
This policy existed regardless of whether the cause of action was brought
under Title VII or section 1981. It coupled this justification with two
other factors. First, the victim of employment discrimination is helpless
to protect his rights against an employer's change of business. Hence,
the successor doctrine should be applied to help protect the victim. Secondly, the successor business can often provide relief at minimum costs.
Thus, there is no strong reason for not applying the successor doctrine.
responsible for negotiating the transfer of assets. The court held as to this claim that the successor

doctrine does not extend to imposing liability on an officer of the successor for a predecessor's § 1981
violation. Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 753.
62. Id. at 743.
63. Id. at 744.
64. For the entire discussion of the differences between Title VII and § 1981 that the district
court felt warranted the decision not to apply the successor doctrine to § 1981 suits, see
Musikiwamba v. ESSI, No. 81 C 6788, Civil (N.D. Ill. 1983).
65. Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 744.
66. The court indicated, however, that its holding was only that the successor doctrine can be
applied to § 1981 cases. Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 755.
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The court found these three justifications equally applicable to section
67
1981 claims as to Title VII claims.
The court also rejected the district court's argument that section
1981's requirement that a plaintiff prove intentional discrimination has
any bearing on whether the successor doctrine applies. The court based
this decision on cases from the Seventh, as well as other circuits, holding
that intent no longer is a pivital factor when deciding whether to impose
68
liability on an innocent party for another's discrimination.
The decision in Musikiwamba was qualified by the court. The court
stated that its holding that the successor doctrine may apply to section
1981 cases does not mean that it will always be applied. 69 Its application
70
will be determined on a case by case basis.
The court's decision in Musikiwamba, however, seemed to have
overlooked some very important questions raised by the district court.
The Seventh Circuit easily dismissed the lower court's finding that because section 1981 cases require a showing of intent, the successor doctrine should not apply. The court merely recited cases that indicate that
intent is irrelevant in deciding whether to impose the successor
71
doctrine.
This response seems to miss the central argument against successor
liability. Musikiwamba and the lower court attempted to indicate that
the intent requirement set down by the Supreme Court for section 1981
suits makes such actions special. The Supreme Court held in General
Building ContractorsAssociation v. Pennsylvania,72 that, unlike Title VII,
intent to discriminate must be proven by the plaintiff in section 1981
cases.
In General Building Contractors,the Supreme Court indicated that
Congress' intent in passing section 1981 was to eradicate those practices
aimed at resurrecting slavery. 73 The Court indicated: "Congress . . .
67. Id. at 746.
68. Id. at 746-47. The court cited Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1985); Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jancson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
69. 760 F.2d at 750.
70. The court ultimately held that the plaintiff's complaint failed to adequately allege a case of
successor liability. In doing so, it examined the nine point test laid out in Bloedel, see supra note 57.
It held that the first two Bloedel factors were critical to the imposition of successor liability. It felt
that Bloedel's seven other factors provided merely a foundation for analysis. The court added a
tenth criteria-whether the predecessor could have provided any or all relief prior to the transfer of
assets. These ten criteria were then applied and the court found Musikiwamba's complaint insufficient to assert successor liability. It granted them leave, however, to amend their complaint.
Musikiwamba, 760 F.2d at 750-53.
71. Id. at 747.
72. 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
73. Id. at 388.
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acted to protect the freed men from intentional discrimination by those
whose object was to make their former slaves dependent serfs, victims of
unjust laws ....
The Court wanted to protect blacks from those who
would discriminate against them. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's indication
that intent is irrelevant to the successor doctrine avoids the fact that it is
relevant to section 1981 cases. The Seventh Circuit's decision in
Musikiwamba seems to have overlooked the Supreme Court's intent requirement laid down in General Building Contractors.
",74

THE REHABILITATION ACT: SECTION

503

In the 1984-85 term the Seventh Circuit addressed whether a party
has an implied private right of action as a third party beneficiary under
section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. 75 The court denied such an implied action. It refused to except third party beneficiaries from its previous holding that no private right of action exists under section 503.76
Background
The Rehabilitation Act was passed by Congress in 1972, and repassed in 1973, in order to create a federal rehabilitation program for the
handicapped that would "make employment and participation in society
more feasible for handicapped individuals. '7 7 Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act requires affirmative action plans to be implemented in
favor of handicapped individuals in all contracts in which federal funds
have been expended. The Act provides an administrative remedy for vio74. Id.
75. Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or agency
for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to
carry out such contract the party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative
action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals as defined
in section 706(7) of this title. The provisions of this section shall apply to any subcontract
in excess of $2,500 entered into by a prime contractor in carrying out any contract for the
procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for
the United States. The President shall implement the provisions of this section by promulgating regulations within ninety days after September 26, 1973.
(b) If any handicapped individual believes any contractor has failed or refuses to comply
with the provisions of his contract with the United States, relating to employment of handicapped individuals, such individual may file a complaint ... and shall take such action
thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant, consistent with the terms of such contract
and the laws and regulations applicable thereto.
29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982).
76. Ernst v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 717 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 707
(1984); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980).
77. Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1240-41 (7th Cir. 1980), (citing S. Rep.
No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2092).
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lations of section 503,78 but courts have split over whether a private
plaintiff may also bring a cause of action. 79 The Seventh Circuit has held
that there is no private cause of action under section 503 .80 In D'Amato v.
Wisconsin Gas Co.," the Seventh Circuit was asked to create an exception to its previous holding by allowing a plaintiff to pursue a private
cause of action as a third party beneficiary under section 503.
D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co.
In D'Amato, Joseph D'Amato claimed that Wisconsin Gas Company violated section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act by firing him from his
job because he suffered from acrophobia. D'Amato contended that he
had enforceable rights under the company's federal contracts, and inherent section 503 requirements because the contracts were made for his
benefit. 8 2 Essentially, D'Amato argued he could sue the company under
section 503 as a third party beneficiary 83 to the company's government
contracts.
The court rejected this argument. The court examined the third
party beneficiary theory and concluded that the capacity to sue as such
existed only if the government contracts were made for D'Amato's direct
benefit. If the contracts were made for other reasons, then D'Amato was
a mere "incidental" beneficiary and could claim no legal right to sue
8
under the contract.

4

By analyzing the government contracts that the gas company entered into, the court concluded that the parties did not intend to make
handicapped persons direct beneficiaries of their contracts because the
contracts were not designed to serve the interests of the handicapped.
The contracts merely required the gas company to take affirmative action
as a promise incidental to a contract to provide goods and services.
Thus, since the main purpose of the contract was unrelated to affirmative
78. See supra note 75.
79. Those finding no right of action include: Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1981); Anderson v. Erie Lackawanna Ry., 468 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.
Ohio 1979); Wood v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Del. 1977). Those finding a
right of action by implication include: Hart v. County of Alameda, No. C-79-0091, WHO (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 10, 1979); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. Fla. 1977); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
80. See supra note 76.
81. 760 F.2d 1474 (7th Cir. 1985).
82. Id. at 1479.
83. "[U]nless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an

intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to
effectuate the intention of the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981).
84. D'Amato, 760 F.2d at 1479.
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action, no third party beneficiary capacity existed.8 5
The court further justified its decision by indicating that the existence of administrative remedies 86 supports the conclusion that Congress
intended no private right of action of any kind under section 503.87 Similarly, the court rejected D'Amato's argument that Congress' enactment
in 1978 of section 504,88 allowing attorney's fees to prevailing private
parties, implied that a private cause of action existed under section 503.
The court viewed this provision as too vague, and its implications too
ambiguous, to infer a private right of action under section 503.89 Hence,
the court concluded that no private cause of action exists for a third
party beneficiary under section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act.
The court's decision was consistent with its previous holding that no
party can bring a private cause of action under section 503. In fact, in
Simpson v. Reynolds Metal Co., the Seventh Circuit examined the legislative history of section 503. 90 It concluded that Congress intended that no
private cause of action exist. The court based this decision primarily on
the existence of administrative remedies. 91 Given its rationale in Simpson, it appears that the Seventh Circuit was very limited in its ability to
allow a cause of action for third party beneficiaries in D'Amato. If Congress intended to exclude private causes of action from allowable section
503 remedies, as the Seventh Circuit contended in Simpson, then that
intent would apply equally to third party beneficiaries. 92 Thus, it seems
that the only consistent way to provide D'Amato with a private cause of
action would have been to overrule Simpson; something the Seventh Cir93
cuit was not willing to do.
85. Id. at 1479-80.
86. See supra note 75.
87. D'Amato, 760 F.2d at 1481.
88. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides in part: (b) In any action or proceeding to
enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in its discretion may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorneys fee as part of the costs.
29 U.S.C. § 794.
89. D'Amato, 760 F.2d at 1483.
90. 629 F.2d 1226, 1240-43.
91. 629 F.2d 1226, 1243-44.
92. If Congress intended to deny a private cause of action to handicapped individuals under
§ 503, such a denial would logically apply to all handicapped individuals regardless of their standing,
unless otherwise indicated by Congress.
93. For other decisions consistent with D'Amato see Hooper v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134 (6th
Cir. 1979); Hodges v. Atchison, T & SF. Ry., 728 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
97 (1984); Chaplin v. Consol. Edison, 579 F. Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Davis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 677 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Stephens v. Roadway Express Co., 29 Empl. Prac.
Sec. (BNA) 32, 41 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Coleman v. Noland Co., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (CCH) 1248

(W.D. Va. 1980).

LABOR LAW. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
PROCEDURAL ISSUES UNDER SECTION

1983

In the 1984-85 term the Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to refine two procedural issues relevant to section 1983. 9 4 In Malcak v. The
Westchester Park District,95 the court held that whether a public employee has a property interest in his job is not necessarily a factual issue.
In Soderbeck v. Burnett County,96 the court established the plaintiff's

burden of proof in a section 1983 case where punitive damages are
sought.
Property Interests Under Section 1983: Malcak v.
Westchester Park District
Section 1983 protects persons against state infringement of personal
constitutional rights. Where a state employee is discriminatorily fired, a
section 1983 claim might arise if the job that was taken was somehow
constitutionally protected. One argument which attempts to afford particular state jobs constitutional protections is that a particular state job
constitutes property which is protected under the fourteenth amendment. 97 However, several questions arose concerning this approach.
Those questions included, how does one prove a property interest? More
recently, the questions have concerned whether a property interest in employment is a question of fact or one of law.
In Board of Regents v. Roth, 98 the Supreme Court discussed the requirements for proving a property interest in future employment. In
Roth, David Roth obtained a one year teaching contract at a state university. After his one year contract expired, the University refused to hire
him for an additional year. Roth brought suit against the University,
claiming that its refusal to provide reasons for not rehiring him deprived
him of procedural due process. The Court held, however, that in order
94. Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation custom or usage, or
any state or territory of the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit or equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
95. Malcak v. Westchester Park Dist., 754 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1985).
96. Soderbeck v. Burnett County, Wis., 752 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1985).
97. The fourteenth amendment provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law ....
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
98. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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to be protected by the fourteenth amendment, Roth's job must constitute
a property interest. 99 In order for such a property interest to exist, the
Court explained, "a person must have more than an abstract need or
desire for it. He must instead have a legitimate claim of entitlement to
°° The Court concluded that since Roth had no contract entitling
it."
him to another year of employment, no mutual understanding with the
University upon which he could rely for future employment, nor any
tenure rights entitling him to future employment, he had no property
interest in his future employment.' 0
In a companion case, Perry v. Sinderman, 0 2 the Court found a
property interest in a teacher's continued employment based on a binding
understanding between the teacher and the college that he would not be
fired as long as his teaching was satisfactory. The Court held that even
though there was no contract for reemployment, or any formal contractual tenure policy, the mutual understanding between the teacher and the
college constituted a legitimate claim or entitlement to his job as long as
he performed satisfactorily.

0 3

Against the background of these Supreme Court cases, in 1983 the
Seventh Circuit decided Vail v. Board of Education of Paris Union School
DistrictNo. 98. 14 In Vail, Jesse Vail accepted a position as coach with
the Paris Union School District. The school district offered him only a
one year contract, but insisted they could assure him of extending the
contract for a second year. Upon the school district's failure to renew his
contract at the end of the first year he sued under section 1983 claiming
deprivation of a property interest without due process of law.' 0 5 Citing
06
Perry to support its decision, the district court ruled in favor of Vail.
On appeal, the School Board argued that under Illinois law there
was no evidence of an implied contract for two years of employment.
The Seventh Circuit held, however, that Illinois law was sufficient in this
case to create a property interest protectable under section 1983. The
court pointed out that what the School Board was really challenging was
the district court's finding of fact surrounding the representations made
by the Board to Vail. The court concluded that these findings of fact
were not erroneous and thus the district court's decision could not be
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 571.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 578.
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Id. at 600-01.
706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1983), aff'd per curiam, 466 U.S. 377 (1984).
Id. at 1436.
Id. at 1437.
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DEVELOPMENTS
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Malcak v. Westchester Park District
In Malcak v. Westchester Park District, the Seventh Circuit was
asked to clarify its holding in Vail, specifically in respect to whether the
question of a property interest in section 1983 cases is always a question
of fact. The plaintiff in Malcak was an employee of the Illinois Park
District. Malcak was terminated from his employment, and as a consequence, he filed a section 1983 suit alleging that he was wrongfully terminated for political reasons. 10 8
The Park District filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. In holding that Malcak was entitled to a
hearing on the termination, the district court cited Vail for the proposition that "the property interest necessary for a § 1983 and Fourteenth
Amendment [sic] due process claim, posed in public employment situations like that alleged by Malcak, is a factual issue.' 1 9 Thus, the district
court held that a material factual issue remained for trial and the claim
could not be disposed of by summary judgment.
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court's interpretation of
Vail was erroneous. It indicated that Vail involved a situation where the
facts supporting the existence of an employment contract were in dispute. In holding that the plaintiff in Vail had a property interest in his
job, the court examined the facts of the case because the facts were specifically in dispute. But, the court in Malcak indicated that if the facts in
Vail had not been disputed, the determination of whether a contract ex0
isted would have been a matter of law. 11
Thus, in Malcak, the Seventh Circuit clarified its holding in Vail.
The court held that Vail does not stand for the proposition that the existence of a property interest is always a factual determination. Rather,
Vail held that "the determination of whether a plaintiff has a property
interest protected by the due process clause may be made by the courts as
a matter of law if the state law from which the interest derives would
allow the determination to be made as a matter of law.""'
The court's decision in Malcak was much needed. Without Malcak,
107. Id. at 1438.
108. Malcak, 754 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1985).
109. Id. at 241.
110. Id. at 242-43.
111. Id. at 243. Under Illinois law, if there is no dispute over the relevant facts, the question of
the existence of a contract is solely a matter of law determined by the court. Bank of Benton v.
Cogdill, 118 Ill. App. 3d 280, 454 N.E.2d 1120, 1125 (1983).
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other courts may have misinterpreted Vail, and based a finding of a property interest exclusively on facts. This would be contrary to the Supreme
Court's directions in Roth, where the Supreme Court indicated that the
existence of a property interest depends upon many factors including
state law. 11 2 Thus, Malcak provided the clarification needed to show
that Vail was not contrary to Roth.
Punitive Damages Under Section 1983. Soderbeck v. Burnett County
A plaintiff who brings an action under section 1983 is entitled to
punitive damages.1 3 In Smith v. Wade,114 the Supreme Court held that
punitive damages may be awarded for "intentional" as well as "reckless"
violations of section 1983, but the Court left unclear the precise definitions of these terms. In Soderbeck v. Burnett County, the Seventh Circuit
attempted to clarify the reckless conduct which might support a section
1983 claim for punitive damages.
In Soderbeck, Arline Soderbeck was fired by the newly elected sheriff from her job as the sheriff's bookkeeper. Soderbeck filed suit under
section 1983 against the new sheriff and the county claiming that she was
wrongfully fired solely as a result of her political affiliations. 115 The jury
held in favor of Soderbeck and awarded her compensatory and punitive
damages.11 6 The district court judge limited the judgment to the com17
pensatory damages, and both sides appealed.'
The Seventh Circuit held that the jury instructions in the Soderbeck
case were not specific enough to insure finding the state of mind necessary for punitive damages.' 18 The court reasoned that instructing a jury
to award punitive damages if the defendants acted with "reckless indifference" would leave the jury free to award punitive damages if it found
that the sheriff or the county was merely careless in firing Soderbeck.1 19
Carelessness, the court reasoned, is not enough to establish reckless112. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
113. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.ll
(1978)).
114. 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
115. Soderbeck, 752 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1985).
116. The jury awarded $33,375 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. Id.
at 287-88.
117. Id. at 288.
118. The instructions to the jury were:
In terminating plaintiff Arline Soderbeck's employment with the Burnett County Sheriff's
Department, did defendant Robert Kellberg act with reckless indifference to the plaintiffs
rights not to be terminated for her association or political activity?
Id. at 290.
119. Id.
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ness. Since the purpose of punitive damages is to deter, 20 a defendant
must know that the conduct which resulted in the plaintiff's injury was
forbidden. Otherwise, an award of punitive damages will have no deterrent effect. 1 2 ' Thus, the court set down as a condition for awarding punitive damages the requirement that a plaintiff show that the defendant
"almost certainly knew" that what he was doing was wrongful and subject to punishment. 22 The court indicated that some action is so con23
trary to basic ethics that knowledge can be presumed.
This requirement was then applied to the Soderbeck facts. The Seventh Circuit found that the discharge of public employees on political
grounds is not yet regarded as something contrary to natural law. Thus,
knowledge that such firing is forbidden cannot be imputed to those responsible for plaintiff's discharge. The court felt this was especially true
24
when the defendant is a minor rural official with no legal training.
Hence, punitive damages could not be awarded.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Soderbeck considerably narrowed
the Supreme Court's ruling in Smith v. Wade. 125 In so doing, it may
have put to rest some fears surrounding the Smith decision. The biggest
fear that resulted from the Supreme Court's decision in Smith was that
allowing punitive damages for less than intentional conduct would open
the floodgates of litigation. 126 This fear may have been due in part to the
Supreme Court's failure to clearly define recklessness. The Seventh Circuit's decision in Soderbeck, by defining recklessness, may have put some
of those fears to rest. 127 The Seventh Cirouit's requirement that a plaintiff prove knowledge of a wrongful act is a very demanding requirement,
120. The following cases have held that the primary purpose of punitive damages, both generally
and in § 1983 cases, is to deter: Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1636 (1983); City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67, 269-70 (1981).
121. Soderbeck, 752 F.2d at 290.
122. Id. at 291.
123. The court gave as examples, conduct that has come to be regarded as morally wrong includ-ing conduct contrary to modern civil rights, as well as the older personal liberties of Americans. Id.
124. Id.
125. In Smith, the court distinguished between evil motive or intent and reckless indifference. It
found that either, however, was an appropriate basis for an award of punitive damages. 103 S. Ct. at
1640. The Seventh Circuit in Soderbeck seems to indicate that intent is the only basis for punitive
damages (i.e. knowledge of the act is required or almost certain knowledge), and hence restricts the
Supreme Court's broad holding in Smith.
126. Three Justices dissented in Smith (Rehnquist, Burger and Powell). They felt that Section
1983 requires proof of intentional injury before punitive damages are appropriate and based this
relief in part on the potential increase in federal cases if a less strict standard were allowed. 103 S.
Ct. at 1651 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor wrote a separate dissent and she too expressed this concern. Id. at 1659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
127. With this tougher burden, the flood of litigation expected after Smith may be decreased, or
at least the fear of it may be put to rest.
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and one not easily met. This strict definition of recklessness will likely
deter frivolous suits under section 1983.
TITLE VII

Employment discrimination which supports a claim under Title

VII 128 can arise in two forms: (1) individual, nonclass discrimination-

where an employer intentionally discriminates against a specific individual employee; and (2) class discrimination-where an employer engages
in a pattern or practice of discriminatory treatment of a protected class
of employees. In its recent term, the Seventh Circuit addressed issues
related to each of these forms of Title VII discrimination. In Jayasinghe
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. ,129 the court held that a claimant in an action
for individual discrimination need not prove his subjective qualifications
for the position which he was denied. In Coates and EEOC v. Johnson,30 the court ruled on the burdens of persuasion where parties to a
class discrimination action use statistical evidence to prove or disprove
such discrimination.
Subjective Qualifications: Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
The United States Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas v.
Greene,13' articulated the elements of a prima facie case for individual
discrimination under Title VII. A claimant must prove that he was intentionally discriminated against by establishing that he was a member of
a protected class, that he applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants, that he was rejected despite his
qualifications, and that the employer either filled the position or continued to seek applications for persons of plaintiff's qualifications. 132 In
Jayasinghe, the Seventh Circuit specifically considered whether the second prima facie element, proof of the claimant's qualifications, requires
proof of the claimant's subjective as well as objective qualifications for
the position which he was denied.
Rajapakse Jayasinghe, a chemist, brought an action against his em128.- Title VII provides in part:
703(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(z)(1982).
129. 760 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1985).
130. 756 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1985).
131. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
132. Id. at 802.
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ployer, Bethlehem Steel, alleging that he was denied a promotion based
on his national origin in violation of Title VII. At trial, Jayasinghe established that he was objectively more qualified for the new position than
two chemists actually promoted. Nevertheless, the district court found
that Jayasinghe failed to establish that he possessed the specific personality characteristics required for the position, 133 and he therefore failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in
defining a prima facie case of discrimination to include such subjective
qualifications as personality characteristics. The court based its holding
that subjective qualifications are excluded from a plaintiff's prima facie
case in part on the reasoning behind the Supreme Court's decision in
Greene. The Seventh Circuit examined the policy reasons the Supreme
Court identified in Greene for requiring a plaintiff to prove a prima facie
case. It then discussed whether requiring a plaintiff to prove subjective
qualifications would further those policies.
First, the requirement that plaintiff prove a prima facie case, which
includes showing that a plaintiff was qualified for the job, provides a useful barrier to unsubstantiated claims of discrimination. That is, by requiring a plaintiff to prove such things as being in a protected class, being
qualified for the job, and having applied for the job which was open or
available when he applied for it, the court can screen out those cases
where an employee is denied a job based on legitimate reasons. 13 4 The
Seventh Circuit explained that proof of subjective qualifications would
not serve this policy goal. This is true, the court stated, because it is
uncommon for an employer to reject applicants with superior objective
qualifications. 135
The second policy reason behind requiring a prima facie case is that
it offers a plaintiff the chance to prove discriminatory intent indirectly.
Thus, a plaintiff who cannot directly prove that an employer intended to
discriminate against him can create the inference of such intent by establishing a prima facie case. 136 This policy would not be served by requiring a plaintiff to prove that he was subjectively qualified in order to
establish a case. This is true because the employer is in a better position
133. The position Jayasinghe sought required the employee to work closely with others.
district court found, however, that the "overwhelming preponderance of evidence established
Jayasinghe was secretive, asocial and occasionally quarrelsome, and that Jayasinghe was not
moted to a supervisory position because of the reasonable prevailing perception of him as one
did not work well with others." Jayasinghe, 760 F.2d 132, 132 (7th Cir. 1985).
134. Id. at 134.

135. Id.
136. Id.

The
that
prowho
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to come forward with his own subjective job requirements. The prospective employee could not know what subjective qualifications were being
sought by the employer. Thus, it would be unreasonable to require a
plaintiff to anticipate and try to prove that he meets those qualifications
at the outset. Such a requirement would make it nearly impossible for a
plaintiff to correctly present a prima facie case, and thus the goal of allowing a plaintiff to create an inference of discrimination would not be
met. Thus, the court held that the policies behind Greene would be better served by limiting a plaintiff's prima facie burden to showing that he
13 7
meets the objective qualifications for the job.
Despite its holding that proof of subjective qualifications are unnecessary in a Title VII case, the Seventh Circuit found that the error was
harmless in the context of the district court's entire analysis. Because the
district court addressed and resolved the ultimate question of whether
Bethlehem Steel intentionally discriminated against Jayasinghe, the Seventh Circuit deemed the district court's error harmless to the outcome of
1 38
the case.
The court's decision in Jayasinghe, appears upon close examination
to add little to "intentional discrimination" analysis. In fact, after
Jayasinghe, many questions remain. First, while the court determined
that subjective qualifications play no part in a plaintiff's prima facie case,
they did not define subjective qualifications. 13 9 What are subjective qualifications? Are they those qualifications that the employer does not express? Or, are they those express qualifications for which there is no
objective measurement such as personality characteristics? If a qualification is reasonably inferable from the job description, is it an objective or
subjective qualification?
Secondly, may a qualification be objective in one case and subjective
137. Of those circuits that have removed subjective qualifications from the prima facie case, most
require a showing of only minimum objective qualifications. See. e.g., Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of
Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 342-43 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982); Lynn v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1344-45 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1981).
The Seventh Circuit, however, has held that in order to show objective qualifications, plaintiff
must show his relative qualifications at the prima facie level. Judge Posner felt that the court's
decision in Jayasinghe was opposite of its decision in Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co., 618 F.2d 1198
(7th Cir. 1980). Jayasinghe, 760 F.2d 132, 137 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., concurring). The court
explained, however, that its decision in Jayasinghe adopts the Holder requirement of relative qualifications and takes it a step further by holding that relative qualifications do not include subjective
qualifications at the prima facie level. Id. at 136 n.4.
138. Id. at 136-37. The Seventh Circuit based this holding on the Supreme Court's decision in
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-15 (1983), where the Court
noted that prima facie burdens are no longer relevant once the defendant has introduced evidence
that would rebut plaintiff's prima facie showing of discrimination.
139. The court's only indication was its example of personality characteristics. Jayasinghe, 760
F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir. 1985).
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in another? For example, are personality characteristics objective qualifications for certain public relations jobs and subjective qualifications for
jobs that require less public contact? These questions are significant because under Greene a plaintiff is still required to prove objective qualifications. By eliminating the need to prove subjective qualifications without
defining what this includes, a plaintiff may fail to plead facts essential
under Greene based on an erroneous belief that the qualifications are subjective and thus need not be proven according to Jayasinghe.
Additionally, the court deemed the inclusion of subjective qualifications in the prima facie case a harmless error. This seems to indicate that
the Seventh Circuit views the prima facie requirements of Greene as relatively meaningless,"40 and merely an alternative to other analyses of intentional discrimination. Given this interpretation, a potential plaintiff
filing a discrimination case under Title VII may be confused concerning
the elements of a prima facie case. Should the plaintiff plead all qualifications, objective and subjective, in order to assure that he has not miscategorized or omitted a qualification and thus failed to fulfill the second
requirement of Greene? Or, is the Greene prima facie requirement a mere
formality that may be taken lightly such that any proof of intentional
discrimination is sufficient? The Seventh Circuit's decision in Jayasinghe
thus left many questions unanswered.
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE UNDER TITLE VII:

Coates and EEOC v. Johnson
In addition to individual discrimination, class discrimination is actionable under Title VII where an employer engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination against a protected group of employees. As the
United States Supreme Court observed in InternationalBrotherhood of
Teamsters, 4 ' proof of unlawful class discrimination will usually consist
of statistical evidence showing a disparity between the employer's treatment of a protected group and an unprotected group.142 Similarly, a defense to class discrimination is often comprised of statistical proof of the
employer's nondiscriminatory treatment of a protected class of employees. The Seventh Circuit in Coates v. Johnson dealt with this statistical
140. By excluding subjective qualifications from the prima facie requirement and then holding
the prima facie requirements irrelevant once the defendant introduces rebuttal evidence, the court
seems to seriously weaken Greene and confuse the importance of a prima facie showing in a Title VII
action.
141. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
142. Id. at 337-39.
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evidence and attempted to define the burdens of proof where both parties
offer statistical evidence.
In Coates, Wesley Coates, a black man, filed suit against Midwest
Diaper Plant alleging individual and class discrimination in violation of
Title VII and section 1981.143 At trial, Coates attempted to prove a pat-

tern or practice of racial discrimination by introducing statistical evi44
dence showing that Midwest discharged more blacks than nonblacks.
In response, Midwest introduced statistics to prove that there was an
independent factor other than race, namely Midwest's disciplinary procedures, that could explain the statistical disparity in discharge rates.
Coates then claimed that Midwest's statistics on this point were tainted
because Midwest also discriminated in discipline. The district court
found that Midwest adequately rebutted Coates' statistical and non-statistical evidence of a pattern or practice of discrimination. 145
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, and seized
an opportunity to clarify the burdens of proof where competing statistics
are offered; a question virtually unexplored by other courts. 14 6 The court
determined that once a defendant introduces statistical evidence which
the plaintiff claims is biased, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion
on the issue of discrimination. 147 Consistent with the general theory behind Title VII actions, complainants retain the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of discrimination. 148 The court felt that it would be
unfair to allow plaintiffs to shift that burden merely by alleging the evi149
dence the defendant seeks to introduce is discriminatory.
The court's decision in Coates presents a potentially troublesome
problem. The court seems to be saying that in every instance where a
defendant introduces statistical evidence to prove that his allegedly discriminatory policies are legitimate, and the plaintiff alleges that those sta143. Coates contended that he and more than 200 other blacks were discharged "as a consequence of a uniform policy and practice to reduce black employment and discriminatorily discharge
black employees at defendant's plant." Coates, 756 F.2d 524, 530 (7th Cir. 1985).

144. Id. at 536.
145. Id. at 530.
146. The court indicated that it had many concerns with the district court's treatment of the
statistical evidence. It limited its analysis to three issues, however: (1) whether pooling of the data
was appropriate; (2) which party bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of whether a variable is
tainted by past discrimination; and (3) what is the appropriate measure for discipline. Id. at 540.
This Comment deals only with the second issue. A few other courts have touched on this issue. See,
e.g., Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 442 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd without opinion, 582
F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978); Agarwal v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
503, 512 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
147. Coates, 756 F.2d at 544.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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tistics are biased, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that those
statistics are biased.
While this placement of the burden may be justified in some instances, it is not justified in all instances. Proving that one particular set
of statistics is biased is often very difficult to do.' 50 Thus, a de facto
placement of the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove bias would
mean that a defendant may introduce any set of statistics, even those the
defendant knows are biased, and under the Coates rule the defendant has
a good chance of winning. Just as the court found it unfair to allow a
plaintiff to shift the burden to the defendant merely by questioning the
defendant's statistics, it is also unfair to allow the defendant to place the
onerous burden of proving bias on the plaintiff merely by introducing
statistics that the defendant knows are biased.15'
In his concurring opinion, Judge Cudahy presented a potential solution to this problem. Once a defendant introduces statistics to prove that
his practices were justified or nondiscriminatory, he should bear the burden of articulating a reason for thinking that those statistics are not biased. 152 If a defendant fails to do so, such failure would result in shifting
the burden to defendant. 153 This approach appears to be fairer to both
parties.
OTHER SEVENTH CIRCUIT LABOR LAW CASES IN BRIEF

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed several
other labor law issues during the 1984-85 term. Cases of note addressed
superseniority clauses and a state recidivism statute.
Ex-Cell-O: Necessity Required For Superseniority Clauses
Pursuant to sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA, 54 it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer or a union to grant employment
privileges based on union participation. 55 The courts, however, have
150. Judge Cudahy articulated this difficulty in his concurring opinion. Id. at 554 (Cudahy, J.,
concurring).
151. The automatic shifting of the burden of proof could in fact encourage a defendant to introduce unsupportable evidence, because, under Coates, a plaintiff would bear the burden of proving
bias. In view of this difficulty, a defendant would almost certainly win.
152. Judge Cudahy indicated that the burden should not always be on the plaintiff to prove that
defendant's statistics are biased. Rather, defendant must articulate a reason why he believes the
factor to be unbiased. If such an articulation is not made, plaintiff would not have the burden of
proof. Id. at 554 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
153. Id.
154. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
155. Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair practice for an employer ... by discrimination in regard to hire or
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recognized a limited exception for superseniority privileges conferred by
a collective bargaining agreement. 56 In Gulton Electro-Voice, 5 7 the
NLRB held that superseniority may only be granted to those union officers whose on-the-job presence at specific times is necessary to administer the collective bargaining agreement. 58 In Local 1384, United
Automobile, Aerospace and AgriculturalImplement Workers of America,
UAW v. NLRB ("Ex-Cell-O"), t5 9 the Seventh Circuit upheld the Gulton
rule because it was rational and consistent with the NLRA. 16° To more
clearly place the Ex-Cell-O decision in its proper legal context, a review
of NLRB decisions concerning superseniority prior to Gulton will precede the detailed presentation of Ex-Cell-O.
Prior to Gulton, in Dairylea Cooperative,'6' the NLRB approved
superseniority only for union stewards in layoff and recall because the
steward's continued presence on the job effectuated the administration of
collective bargaining agreements.162 The NLRB presumed all other
superseniority clauses to be unlawful. Subsequently, in United Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 623 ("Limpco"), t63 the
NLRB held that Dairylea should not be construed narrowly, but should
be interpreted to permit superseniority for union officers whose responsibilities "bear a direct relationship to the effective and efficient representatenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
Section 8(b)(2) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ... to cause or
attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1982).
156. A superseniority clause in a collective bargaining agreement ensures that specified union
officers will receive "certain seniority-linked benefits,... regardless of their natural seniority." Local
1384, United Auto., Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. NLRB, 756
F.2d 482, 488 (1985).
157. 266 N.L.R.B. 406 (1983), enforced sub nom. Local 900, IUE v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
158. 266 N.L.R.B. at 409.
159. 756 F.2d 482 (1985).
160. 756 F.2d at 494. Board rulings are subject to limited judicial review of rationality and
consistency with the NLRA. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978). Upon review, a
court of law must uphold a rational and consistent Board ruling, regardless of how it might have
decided the case on its merits. Local 900, IUE v. NLRB, 727 F.2d at 1189; NLRB v. Niagara Mach.
and Tool Works, 746 F.2d 143, 148 (2nd Cir. 1984).
161. 219 N.L.R.B. 656 (1975), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees
Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976).
162. 219 N.L.R.B. at 658. The court held that the discrimination created was "simply an incidental side effect of a more general benefit accorded all employees." Id.
163. Limpco Mfg. Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 406 (1977), petition for review denied sub. nom. D'Amico
v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1978).
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tion of unit employees.'' 6

Following Limpco, unions were able to

contrive a superseniority by appointing unlimited numbers of members
1 65
as "officials."
Gulton, the NLRB's first unanimous superseniority decision, expressly overruled Limpco. 166 According to the Seventh Circuit in ExCell-O, the only sufficient justification under Gulton for an employer
granting transfer privileges to a union official would be the necessity of
the official's on-the-job presence.1 67 If the employer grants such privileges, however, with an intent to encourage or discourage union participation, then the employer commits an unfair labor practice under section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 168 The court will presume improper intent where
the practice is inherently discriminatory. 169 Because superseniority privileges are inherently discriminatory,17 0 a union must prove the necessity
of an official's on-the-job presence in order to overcome the presumption
of improper intent.17
In Ex-Cell-O, the court reviewed two cases. In the first case, the
employer transferred the union recording secretary from the night shift
to the day shift, resulting in the involuntary transfer of a day-time employee with greater seniority. 172 In the second case, the employer, facing
a reduction of the work force, demoted an employee with greater seniority than the union's financial secretary-treasurer. 173 The NLRB held
that neither union official's presence was necessary to administer their
164. 230 N.L.R.B. at 407-08. In Limpco, the employer retained the employment of the union
recording secretary while employees with greater seniority were laid off.
165. Superseniority: Post-Dairylea Developments, 29 CASE W. RES. 499, 517 (1979). See, e.g.,
Otis Elevator, 231 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1977). The dissent of Members Jenkins and Penello, in Limpco,
foresaw this occurrence. 230 N.L.R.B. at 409 (Jenkins and Penello, dissenting).
166. 266 N.L.R.B. at 406. The Limpco dissent laid the foundation for Gulton, stating that a
standard based on efficiency, rather than necessity, benefitted only the immediate beneficiary and not
all union members. 230 N.L.R.B. at 409 (Jenkins and Penello, dissenting). In Ex-Cell-O, the court
upheld the NLRB's freedom to "change its mind on matters of law." even following enforcement of
the previous rule in a court of appeals. 756 F.2d at 492. Furthermore, the Gulton decision should
not have been unexpected given the strong dissents which preceded it and the changes in the
NLRB's composition. NLRB v. Ensign Elec. Div. of Harvey Hubble, 767 F.2d at 1101-02.
167. 756 F.2d at 488.
168. Id. at 487-88. See also Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-44 (1954).
169. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967). The Supreme Court distinguished two types of discriminatory conduct: (1) inherently discriminatory, and (2) marginally
discriminatory.
170. 756 F.2d at 494. The court further stated that Gulton is compatible with Great Dane.
171. Id. at 488 (citing Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 33-34). See also Radio Officers', 347 U.S. at 45
(General Counsel need not prove improper intent "when such encouragement or discouragement is a
natural consequence of the discriminatory action").
172. Ex-Cell-O, 756 F.2d at 484. The president and recording secretary had previously missed
deadlines and had difficulty communicating because they worked different shifts. Id. at 485.
173. Id. at 485-86.
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respective collective bargaining agreements as required by Gulton.174
175
Therefore, neither union official was entitled to superseniority.
The Seventh Circuit's affirmance of the Gulton rule as rational and
consistent with the NLRA is consistent with the decisions of other circuits which have recently considered Gulton. 176 In NLRB v. Niagara
Machine and Tool Works, 1 7 7 the Second Circuit noted that "the Board in
Gulton fashioned a clear-cut rule that resolved the uncertainty created by
its earlier decisions." 1 78 In Gulton, the NLRB unanimously recognized
the inherently discriminatory nature of superseniority clauses and restricted their invocation to situations in which such discrimination was
necessary. The NLRB has preserved the separation of employment privileges and union participation in all but the most extraordinary instances.
Clearly, the Gulton rule is rational and consistent with the NLRA.
Gould: FederalPreemption of a State Recidivism Statute
On May 21, 1980, the State of Wisconsin enacted legislation which
barred employers from conducting business with the State for three years
if three or more NLRB findings against the employer had been affirmed
by a federal court of appeals within a five year period. 79 In Gould v.
174. Id. The NLRB decided Gulton subsequent to the administrative hearings in the two subject
cases. Though the issue of retroactivity is not raised in Ex-Cell-O, Gulton's retroactivity has been
upheld in other jurisdictions. See NLRB v. Niagara Mach. and Tool Works, 746 F.2d 143, 151 (2d
Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Ensign Elec. Div. of Harvey Hubble, 767 F.2d 1100, 1102 (4th Cir. 1985).
175. In Ex-Cell-O, the court also rejected the unions' argument that the unions waived their
members' right against unnecessary superseniority. 756 F.2d at 494-95. A union may waive its
members' economic rights. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 705 (1983). The right
"to be free of discrimination that encourages union activism" is not an economic right, however, and
may not be waived. 756 F.2d at 494. See also Gulton, 727 F.2d at 1190; Niagara Mach. and Tool,
746 F.2d at 150.
176. See Local 900, IUE v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Niagara Mach.
and Tool Works, 746 F.2d 143 (2nd Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Ensign Elec. Div. of Harvey Hubble, 767
F.2d 1100 (4th Cir. 1985).
177. 746 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1984).
178. Id. at 151. Accord Local 900, IUE, 727 F.2d at 1195.
179. Gould v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 576 F. Supp. 1290, 1292
(W.D. Wis. 1983). The statutes read in pertinent part:
The [Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations] shall maintain a list of persons or firms that have been found by the national labor relations board, and by 3 different
final decisions of a federal court within a 5-year period ... to have violated the national
labor relations act .... A name shall remain on the list for 3 years.

Wis. STAT. § 101.245 (1981).
The [department of administration] shall not purchase any product known to be manufactured or sold by any person or firm included on the list of labor law violators ... under
§ 101.245.
WIS. STAT. § 16.75(8) (1981).

The list maintained under § 101.245 was referred to as "the labor law violator's list." Gould,
576 F. Supp. at 1292.
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Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 8 0° a
barred employer challenged the Wisconsin statutes' constitutionality.' 8'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that,
under the Supremacy Clause, 8 2 the NLRA preempted the Wisconsin
statutes. 183
The United States Supreme Court, in San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, 8 4 held that the NLRA preempted state laws which
attempted to regulate activity protected or prohibited by the NLRA.'8 5
In Gould, the State argued that Garmon only applies to state attempts to
prohibit NLRA-protected activities.18 6 The court held, however, that
Garmon applies to state attempts to prohibit NLRA-prohibited activities
87

as well. 1

The NLRA, however, does not expressly prohibit recidivism. 8 8 In
Gould, the court held that "Congress' failure to [directly prohibit recidivism] does not necessarily imply that the remedy is thereby left to the
states.' 189 Rather, the court examined the federal and state interests involved and "the potential for interference with federal regulation."'' 90
The court's primary objection to the Wisconsin statute was that the
recidivism provision was punitive.19' Congress designed the NLRA as a
180. 750 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1984), affd, 106 S. Ct. 1057 (1986).
181. None of the employer's three divisions which had violated the NLRA were located in Wisconsin. 750 F.2d at 610.
182. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cf. 2.
183. 750 F.2d at 615.
184. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
185. Id. at 244. The Supreme Court held that "to allow the states to control conduct which is
the subject of national regulation would create potential frustration of national purposes."
186. 750 F.2d at 612.
187. Id. See also In re Sewell, 690 F.2d 403, 408 (4th Cir. 1982) (Garmon applies to state statutes which attempt "to redress conduct prohibited by § 8 of the Act"). The court, in Gould, also
rejected the State's attempt to draw an analogy between the case before it and a dormant commerce
clause case, stating that, in Gould, Congress had "legislated decisively in the area." 750 F.2d at 613.
188. 750 F.2d at 612.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 611. The Supreme Court has held that it will sustain a state law which addresses
activity "merely peripheral" to a federal law or which concerns interest "deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility." Belknap v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 498 (1983). See also Garmon, 359 U.S. at
243; Sears, Roebuck v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 200 (1978); Farmer
Special Admin. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1977). The following cases
exemplify lawful state regulations under Garmon: Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53
(1966) (slanderous statements made during the course of a labor dispute were actionable); Farmer,
430 U.S. 290 (allowed a state action for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sears, 436 U.S.
180 (allowed a state action for trespass).
191. 750 F.2d at 611 n.4, 614. The court rejected the employer's argument that the Wisconsin
law unlawfully infringed upon its right to a federal appeal because the employer stood to incur
harsher sanctions if it appealed an NLRB decision (the statute only counted NLRB decisions which
had been affirmed by a federal court of appeals). Id. at 614. The court held that "[tihe possibility of
incurring harsher sanctions because of an appeal is not an unheard of event in our system of law."
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remedial statute, not as a punitive statute. 192 Furthermore, the Wisconsin statute punished employers for the same conduct prohibited by the
NLRA. Repetition does not change the nature of the violative conduct.
Thus, the court held that the Wisconsin recidivism statute significantly
193
interfered with the NLRA.
The State has a legitimate interest in choosing those parties with
whom it will do business. Thus, the states are generally given a greater
1 94
range of control as market participants than as market regulators.
The State's efforts in Gould, however, clearly contradict the nature and
purposes of the NLRA. As a result, the court correctly preserved the
remedial nature of the NLRA.
CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit decided several labor cases during the 1984-85
term. In the area of employment discrimination, the Seventh Circuit decisions reflect the growing need to clarify the law of employment discrimination. In Malcak v. Westchester Park District, for example, the court
held that whether a public employee has a property interest in his job is
not necessarily a factual issue. In Soderbeck v. Burnett County, the court
established the plaintiffs burden of proof in a section 1983 suit seeking
punitive damages. The court held that a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant had knowledge of a wrongful act in order to present a prima
facie case.
The Seventh Circuit also clarified burden of proof requirements in
the Title VII area. In Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., the court held
that in an action for individual discrimination, the claimant need not
prove his subjective qualifications for the job in order to present a valid
prima facie case. And, in Coates and EEOC v. Johnson, the court held
that where a defendant introduces statistical evidence to prove that his
policies do not constitute class discrimination, and the plaintiff contends
that those statistics are biased, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
that bias. These cases present refinements to previous Supreme Court
cases that have laid down the general prima facie burdens in this area.
This need to refine the law in particular employment discrimination
Id. (citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 (1973)). As a result, the court reversed the
district court's award of attorney's fees based on the appeal right claim. 750 F.2d at 617.
192. 750 F.2d at 611. Federal sanctions end upon rectification of the unlawful conduct.
193. Id. at 615.
194. Cf Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (dormant commerce clause analysis does not
apply where the State acts as a market participant). See also White v. Massachusetts Council of
Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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contexts was further expressed in Musikiwamba v. ESSI. There the court
had to determine whether to expand the Supreme Court's application of
the successor doctrine in NLRA cases to section 1981 cases. The Seventh Circuit held that such an application should be made and thus applied the successor doctrine to section 1981 cases. Finally, in D'Amato v.
Wisconsin Gas, the Seventh Circuit held that there is no private cause of
action as a third party beneficiary under section 503 of the Rehabilitation
Act. Each of these decisions reflects the Seventh Circuit's recognition
that employment discrimination law is a complex and rapidly changing
area and one that needs clarifying and refining in order to better serve the
parties involved.
In Gould, the Seventh Circuit held that the federal interest in preserving the remedial nature of the NLRA outweighed the state's interest
in choosing those businesses with which it wished to do business as a
market participant based on previous NLRA violations. The Seventh
Circuit regarded the state's conduct as punitive, and thus preempted by
the NLRA. The remainder of the cases herein discussed reflect the Seventh Circuit's continued efforts to balance the often divergent interests of
the union, employer, and individual employees represented by the union.
In Hudson and Ex-Cell-O, the Seventh Circuit held that the respective
union actions did not warrant the resultant abridgements of the aggrieved individual employee's rights. Ex-Cell-O is consistent with
Fourth Circuit and Second Circuit decisions upholding the Gulton rule.
Hudson, however, represents a novel approach to the constitutional
rights of nonunion members of a bargaining unit. The Supreme Court's
affirmance of Hudson further reflects a trend toward imposing a greater
burden on unions to justify attempts to abridge the rights of employees.

